Question. DP §4.6 says envy is “an inevitable by-product of original nature, like shadow cast by object in light.” If envy is inevitable in unfallen beings, does the original nature itself contain fall-conducive structural features? This would entail that the fall is probable (not just possible) under DP’s anthropology — a stronger theodicy claim than usually noticed. The Augustinian tradition deliberately rejects this — unfallen nature is uncorrupted and cannot generate fall-conducive emotions.
Why it matters. thread-dp-pre-fall-envy-vs-augustine-simultaneous-fall surfaced that DP requires envy in an unfallen archangel to motivate the fall. If envy is “an inevitable by-product” of original nature, DP commits to a stronger anthropological claim than DP’s text usually advertises. The Augustinian critique then lands: DP’s framework is closer to “nature has a fall-conducive flaw” than to “nature is good but immature.”
Current best guesses. The defensible reading is immaturity not flaw: envy as a possible emotional response in growth-stage beings (not yet perfected) but not an automatic consequence of original nature. The “inevitable by-product” language is overreaching; the more defensible claim is that the conditions for envy can arise in pre-completion beings, who must rightly direct emotional responses back to God rather than acting on them. This preserves DP’s theodicy (the archangel could feel diminished love and turn that into envy-as-action) without committing to a flawed-nature anthropology.
Source. Raised in _meta/parking/questions.md (dp-1-2 cluster). Engaged by thread-dp-pre-fall-envy-vs-augustine-simultaneous-fall in cluster theodicy-fall-and-divine-constraint.