Question. SMM repeatedly says God cannot punish Satan — not will not but cannot (e.g., “The good God cannot strike the evil Satan,” 210-340, 1990.12.27; “God cannot come down hard on Satan,” 35-95, 1970.10.4). Is this a genuine limitation on God’s power, or is it a moral/principled self-restraint that God freely chooses?
Why it matters. Classical theism (Aquinas, Calvin) holds that God’s omnipotence is absolute — He can do anything logically possible, including punish Satan — and any apparent limitation is God’s free choice. SMM’s language consistently implies something stronger: a real constraint, not a choice. If it is a genuine limitation, UC theology departs sharply from classical theism on divine sovereignty. If it is a choice, the drama is different — God has power but refuses to use it, which raises its own theodicy questions about why He would choose this path for so long.
Current best guesses.
- Limitation reading. The “cannot” language is intentional and consistent. God is bound by the principles of creation He authored, and violating those principles would unmake His own identity as the Absolute Being. The constraint is therefore self-authored but real — analogous to how God “cannot” lie (Heb 6:18) not from lack of power but from identity.
- Choice reading. The constraint is ultimately moral: God could act by force but chooses not to because doing so would produce only coerced submission, not the voluntary love that is His actual goal (see csg-gods-omnipotence-operates-within-principle).
- Resolution. The two may converge: if God’s identity is constituted by love and truth, then “choosing” to uphold those principles is not distinguishable from being constituted by them. But this synthesis needs a thread to work out.
Triggered by csg-satan-accusation-rights-basis, csg-god-bound-by-own-law, csg-god-cannot-punish-satan-unilaterally.