Claim. God’s predestination is bounded by goodness. The fall, human sin, the rejection of central figures, and the destruction of the cosmos are not predestined outcomes — they result from human-portion default joined to Satan, not from any divine decree.
Elaboration. dp-1-the-predestination-of-god-s-will argues that if God is the Author of goodness, then His purpose of creation is good, His providence of restoration is good, and His Will to fulfill that providence is good. Anything that obstructs that fulfillment — the Fall, sins making fallen humanity liable to judgment, cosmic destruction — therefore cannot have been predestined; if such evils were inevitable products of God’s decree, He could not be the Author of goodness.
DP cites God’s regret as exegetical evidence: scripture records divine sorrow over the depravity of fallen humanity (Gen 6:6) and over King Saul’s faithlessness (1 Sam 15:11). A God who had predestined those outcomes would have no occasion for regret. Hence evil is “not the result of God’s predestination, but rather the result of human beings failing to fulfill their responsibility and instead joining hands with Satan.”
Significance. This is DP’s explicit anti-Calvinist move at the level of scope. Where Reformed doctrine reads God as sovereignly permitting (or even decreeing) the Fall as part of the felix culpa of redemption, DP narrows divine predestination to good outcomes only — making the Fall a genuine human-portion failure with no divine-decree backing. The same framing makes the cross contingent rather than primary (see dp-cross-was-not-gods-primary-plan) and shapes DP’s theodicy throughout.
See also. dp-three-reasons-god-did-not-intervene-in-the-fall · dp-human-portion-of-responsibility-inviolable-even-by-god.