Claim
Divine Principle teaches that during the restoration providence, what counts as “good” is direction-of-providence-relative — actions that advance the restoration are good, actions that retard it are evil, even when those actions would not be commendable by common-sense ethical standards. The position grounds DP’s reading of providential figures (Jacob’s deception of Isaac, Tamar’s seduction of Judah, Rahab’s lying, etc.) as good rather than as mixed cases.
Reasoning
Per dp-gods-side-vs-satans-side-determined-by-direction-of-providence-not-common-sense, DP holds that good and evil are determined by purpose-direction, not by act-form. An act that conforms to the restoration’s direction is on God’s side; an act that opposes it is on Satan’s side. The same act-form (lying, killing, sexual transgression) can be either good or evil depending on which direction it serves.
The position grounds DP’s exegesis of OT figures: Jacob’s deception of Isaac was good (advancing the providence); Tamar’s deception of Judah was good (preserving the messianic line); Rahab’s lying to protect Israelite spies was good (serving restoration). These figures’ actions are not evaluated by Decalogue surface-content but by providential-direction service.
The position couples to dp-four-position-foundation-as-fundamental-goodness (goodness is structural alignment with God-centered four-position foundation) and to DP’s broader account of how the OT providence operated through morally complex agents.
Counter-argument
The strongest critique is Aquinas’s natural-law moral realism (Aquinas 1265, Summa Theologiae I-II Q94 a.2, a.4):
“good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that ‘good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.‘” (ST I-II Q94 a.2)
“the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge.” (ST I-II Q94 a.4)
Aquinas’s position: there is a universal natural law accessible to human reason, the same in all persons as to general principles. The Decalogue’s prohibitions (against lying, killing, theft, adultery, etc.) are not arbitrary commands but expressions of this natural law. Acts that violate the natural law are intrinsically evil — their evil does not depend on context or direction. Lying, for example, is malum in se (evil in itself), not malum prohibitum (evil because prohibited).
Aquinas does allow nuance: in I-II Q94 a.4, he notes that applied detail can vary by circumstance (“in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude… and as to knowledge”). But this variation operates at the level of how general principles apply to particulars — not at the level of whether the general principles themselves change.
The bite for DP: DP’s “relative goodness” appears to make general principles themselves direction-relative, not just their applied detail. Lying-to-advance-providence becomes good in a way that lying-to-retard-providence is not. This conflicts with Aquinas’s claim that “good is to be done, evil avoided” applies uniformly — lying is evil regardless of which direction it serves, even if extenuating circumstances reduce culpability.
Kantian deontological ethics (Kant 1785, Groundwork) presses the point further: the categorical imperative tests acts by their universalizability, not by their consequences. An act-maxim that cannot be universalized (lying-when-it-advances-my-goals) is impermissible regardless of what goal it advances. DP’s “relative goodness” is, on Kantian grounds, a category mistake — goodness cannot be relative to consequences without ceasing to be morally binding.
Response
The DP defense distinguishes act-form from providential-act.
(1) The relative-goodness claim operates at the level of providential acts, not common-sense acts. When DP reads Jacob’s deception of Isaac as “good,” DP is not endorsing deception as a general moral practice; DP is saying that this specific act in this providential context served God’s purpose and is therefore evaluated providentially as advancing restoration. The act-form (deception) retains its natural-law character; the providential evaluation operates as a second-level assessment of the act’s effect on the providence.
(2) Aquinas himself allows context-dependent variation in applied detail. I-II Q94 a.4’s “in some few cases it may fail” creates room for situations where the general principle’s application depends on circumstances. DP’s relative-goodness may operate within this allowed range — extreme providential circumstances permit acts that would not be permissible in ordinary circumstances. This is essentially Aquinas’s own framework applied to extreme cases.
(3) The deeper disagreement is methodological. Aquinas’s natural law is accessible to reason — humans can in principle work out what is right by reflecting on human nature. DP’s providential evaluation is not accessible to reason alone — it requires knowing the direction of God’s providence, which requires revelation. DP’s “relative goodness” claim presupposes that the providence has a direction discernible from outside ordinary moral reasoning, which Aquinas would resist.
Still wrestling — does DP’s “relative goodness” extend to every moral category or only to means-to-providential-ends cases? If the former, DP commits to a comprehensive consequentialism that the Aquinas critique destroys. If the latter, DP’s position is a narrow exception-class that classical Christian theology has analogs for (e.g., the just-war tradition’s allowance of killing under specific conditions; the lying-to-Nazis case in 20th-century Christian ethics). The narrow reading is defensible; the comprehensive reading is not. DP’s text appears to want the comprehensive reading; the cost is high.
See also
- dp-four-position-foundation-as-fundamental-goodness
- dp-good-and-evil-discerned-by-purpose-direction-not-form
- Research notes:
_meta/research/theodicy-fall-and-divine-constraint.md